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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y -- ADDED NORFORN CAPTION TO PARAGRAPHS

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TAGS: NATO PREL AF
SUBJECT: NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL READOUT - OCTOBER 3, 2007

Classified By: DCM Richard G. Olson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

11. (C/NF) Summary from the NAC Meeting:

-- Afghanistan: MG Robert Cone, Commander of the U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), reported on progress and challenges training Afghan National Security Forces and noted new efforts to build police through &Focused District Development.8 SHAPE DCOS Ops MG Wright briefed on the launch of Operation Pamir and provided updates on the status of integrating Afghan staff officers into ISAF HQ, as well as civilian casualties investigations.

Mr. Peter Holland, the Head of the Afghan Anti-Drug Unit at the UK FCO, briefed the NAC on the counternarcotics (CN) situation in Afghanistan. Noting the increase in poppy cultivation in the south, Holland stated there has been progress implementing the CN multi-pillar strategy, targeting eradication, traffickers, alternative livelihoods, justice sector, and noted that the drop in cultivation in the north can be linked to economic factors. Holland commented that one way to drive a wedge between the traffickers and Taliban is to recognize their different motives. He spoke highly of the U.S.-led Good Performers Initiative and voiced his belief that the NATO OPLAN is a sufficient framework to make progress on CN, but added that ISAF can contribute more on intel/info sharing, better strategic messaging, and more support to Afghan law enforcement. Later in the day, Mr. Holland provided the same briefing to the Policy Coordination Group in ISAF format, which included ISAF partner countries.

-- Balkans: No discussion.

-- Darfur: The SYG commended nations) particularly the U.S. and the UK) who have provided airlift to the AU under the NATO umbrella. He then called on member states to offer airlift for the Ghanaian civil police detachment that is part of the autumn rotation and emphasized the importance of NATO

demonstrating to the AU that it is a reliable partner.

-- Iraq: The SYG noted with regret the attempt on the life of the Polish Ambassador to Iraq, General Edward Pietrzyk.

-- Response to Terrorism: The SYG expressed condolences for recent attacks in Turkey and noted that, in reference to last week's briefing on homegrown terrorism, a paper will be published by TTIU on the significance of the Indian subcontinent to homegrown terrorism. The Turkish PermRep told the NAC that recent attacks were consistent with tactics perpetrated by the PKK and noted an agreement signed on September 28 between Turkey and Iraq to cooperate against terrorism, specifically the PKK and Al Qaida. The SYG stated that the Office of Security will examine the update to the paper on NATO's contribution to counter-terrorism that it prepared for the 2006 NATO Summit in Riga with the aim of preparing a new paper for the 2008 Bucharest Summit.

-- AOB: The SYG noted that the military advice on alternative ways to structure the NRF was under silence until today at 17:00. He stated his concern that the military advice alone would not be enough for Defense Ministers to have a substantive discussion at the informal Defense Ministerial October 24-25. The lack of detail could also negatively affect the November NRF Force Gen conference.

END SUMMARY.

Afghanistan

¶12. (C/NF) MG Cone briefed the NAC on CSTC-A's efforts to train Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) forces, citing adequate progress with the ANA, and significant problems remaining with the ANP (slides emailed to EUR/RPM). He stated that CSTC-A had shifted approximately 30% of its training resources from the ANA to the ANP, and highlighted the crucial role that NATO Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) needed to play in order to enable the ANA to continue its upward development trajectory, while enabling more U.S. embedded trainers to shift their focus to the ANP. Acknowledging the prior lack of unity of effort on police development among the international community, he pointed to the new International Police Coordination Board as a potential remedy and described to the NAC the Focused District Development (FDD) program for the ANP. The FDD aims to use select districts as the building blocks for a strategic ANP presence throughout Afghanistan; these districts are selected in close cooperation with ISAF's overall campaign plan.

¶13. (C/NF) Looking first at the ANA, MG Cone stated that approximately 50,000 (out of a planned force of 70,000) ANA soldiers had been assigned, and the major challenge now was getting them into the fight properly equipped. All five Maneuver Corps, and ten of fourteen Brigade HQs, have been stood up. Over the next four months, he anticipated, roughly 7,000 new ANA soldiers would deploy, largely to the south and the east. While noting chronic ANA shortfalls of key enablers (particularly close air support and medevac) necessary for the ANA to conduct fully independent operations, he stated the ANA is increasingly taking the lead and performing well with the assistance of NATO OMLTs and U.S. ETTs (Embedded Training Teams). He described how better pay and planned leave rotations have led to increased retention rates (around 45-65%) and reduced AWOL rates. With electronic funds transfers and dependable leave, soldiers no longer have to go AWOL to give money to their families or take care of family business. Improved retention has led to an improved NCO corps and enhanced professionalism. The major problems included over-reliance on centralization that hampered decision-making in the field, a tendency for ANA units to rely on handouts from the civilian population instead of their logistics network (which is in place, MG Cone said), and inadequate equipment.

¶ 4. (C/NF) MG Cone cited a lack of unity of effort by the international community over the past years as a key factor in the lack of development of the ANP, pointing to the new International Police Cooperation Board as a potential fix that could help all actors pull in the same direction. He acknowledged the conflicting visions among the international community of the ideal role and composition of an Afghan police force, describing the different types of police that made up the ANP, including the uniformed police, Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), Afghan Border Police (ABP), Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), and Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP). The FDD aims to harmonize competing international views, bringing together the right mix of police and army forces in tailored packages for key districts, breaking the cycle of corruption and as MG Cone described, &putting the stakes in the ground on which the future ANP presence will be built.⁸ MG Cone told the NAC he was working well with new EUPOL head General Schulz, and that he hoped EUPOL could bring higher-end training capabilities (meaning district and province-level mentoring) as part of the FDD program.

¶ 5. (C/NF) At several points throughout the brief, MG Cone showed how NATO's inability to fulfill its commitment to field OMLTs hampers both ANA development and, importantly, U.S. efforts to enhance ANP training. Of the 103 OMLTs that will be required when the ANA reaches its authorized strength of 70,000, 44 have been offered, with 22 on the ground, and 22 more in the pipeline. This OMLT shortfall impacts the ability of Afghan forces to perform current missions in the field, hampers their long-term development, and prevents the U.S. from bolstering police training efforts, MG Cone emphasized.

¶ 6. (C/NF) Ambassador Nuland thanked Allies for present OMLT contributions, but reminded of the need to at least double the numbers by winter. She invited MG Cone to give the NAC a &target list⁸ of nations he thought were capable to do more, asked about ANCOP capabilities to hold ground ISAF had cleared (too soon to judge, MG Cone assessed), and encouraged the teamwork in the FDD program between CSTC-A and EUPOL that MG had cited. The UK PermRep asked about integrating traditional tribal Afghan justice actors such as the &Arbakai⁸ into overall police efforts in tribal areas (MG Cone replied the idea had merit as long as it was tied into national police efforts and structure). The German PermRep asked where the delineation of responsibilities between ANA and ANP should be drawn, specifically questioning who should perform the &hold⁸ function in a piece of territory that ISAF had &cleared.⁸ Each situation was unique, MG Cone stated. He agreed that police should not be expected to engage enemy forces in direct combat, and explained that if ISAF forces had killed all the enemy forces in an operation, perhaps a holding operation could be conducted with police. But if enemy forces had simply melted away in the presence of ISAF, then ANA and heavier forces would be necessary to prevent a return, he concluded. The Polish PermRep asked about the representation of different ethnicities in the ANP, particularly Pashtuns from the south and east. MG Cone noted that progress on this issue has not been satisfactory.

¶ 7. (C/NF) In the weekly operational update to the Council, SHAPE DCOS for Operations MG Wright briefed on the October 1 commencement of Operation Pamir, which replaced Now Ruz as COMSAF's theater-wide effort. Pamir aims to take advantage of the historical enemy tendency to seek winter sanctuary by bottling up insurgents in those sanctuaries, separating them from the local population, and degrading leadership and fighting capabilities in advance of spring 2008. MG Wright updated on the status of ISAF HQ's &Project 65,⁸ which aims to integrate 15 staff officers in ISAF HQ by mid-to-late 2008, and 50 in the five ISAF Regional Commands. Eleven Afghan candidates have been identified for ISAF HQ, but ISAF has experienced significant challenges finding qualified personnel via the MOD. Language skills are often a stumbling block. Finally, MG Wright gave an update on the status of ISAF investigations into civilian casualty incidents. Of nine events from September 6 to October 2, three

investigations are closed and six are open. COMISAF recently ruled that ISAF forces acted properly in the September 19 incident in Gereshk, where ISAF close air support accidentally killed eight civilians. The Spanish PermRep asked when the NAC would see results of an investigation into allegations of large numbers of civilian casualties in the Shindand district of Herat province April 29-30. The Chairman of the Military Committee reminded the Spaniard that the Shindand incident involved OEF forces, not ISAF, but that SHAPE would inquire with USCENTCOM nonetheless. The UK PermRep continued his campaign (three straight weeks of similar interventions) to place a senior Afghan military officer into ISAF HQ, who could help with &synergy of effort,⁸ and help with &presentation⁸ by portraying ISAF efforts to include Afghans. The Canadian PermRep reiterated his call last week for the NAC briefings to encompass political developments as well as operational content, citing President Karzai's dialogue with the Taliban, PRT progress reports, and Pakistani political developments as pertinent subjects for the NAC to consider.

¶18. (C/NF) Mr. Peter Holland, the Head of the Afghan Anti-Drug Unit at the UK FCO, briefed the NAC on the counternarcotics (CN) situation in Afghanistan. His remarks were similar to a briefing he gave at the NAC March 28. Noting the increase in poppy cultivation in the south, Holland stated there has been progress implementing the CN multi-pillar strategy, targeting eradication, traffickers, alternative livelihoods, justice sector, etc. He noted that the drop in cultivation in the north can be linked to economic factors) a drop in opium prices and an increase in input costs created a reduction in production. He said that we must continue to address those factors but should not be surprised if there is a cyclical rebound in cultivation in the future.

¶19. (C/NF) For the future, Holland commented that one way to drive a wedge between the traffickers and Taliban is to recognize their different motives. Traffickers are motivated by money not ideology, so when their financial risks increase, they will change their behavior, which the Taliban may not do. He noted that improved public messaging and better agricultural development projects are important, and he spoke highly of the U.S.-led Good Performers Initiative. More challenging goals include addressing corruption and more effective eradication.

¶110. (C/NF) Holland believes the ISAF OPLAN is a sufficient framework to make progress on CN, adding that ISAF and PRTs have been helpful in many ways, from organizing shuras to supporting logistics for AEF. ISAF can contribute more, he added, on intel/info sharing, better messaging, and more support to law enforcement.

¶111. (C/NF) In response to PermReps, questions, Holland noted that while eradication runs a risk of alienating farmers and making the Taliban message more attractive to them, such exploitation by the Taliban is already going on and is a part of the environment, with or without eradication. This concern should not hold back our CN efforts, he stated. Regarding opium processing, he noted that processing labs are mobile and easy to set up. ISAF can close labs where they come upon them, but the more important effort is to dismantle networks so the labs do not reappear.

¶112. (C/NF) Later in the day, Mr. Holland provided the same briefing to the Policy Coordination Group in ISAF format, which included ISAF partner countries.

¶113. (C/NF) UK PermRep Eldon spoke highly of his trip to Afghanistan last week with Ambassador Nuland, particularly commenting on signs of progress in Sangin province.

Balkans

¶114. (C/NF) No discussion.

Darfur

¶15. (C/NF) The SYG commended nations) particularly the U.S. and the UK) who have provided airlift to the AU under the NATO umbrella. He then called on member states to offer airlift for the Ghanaian civil police detachment that is part of the autumn rotation and emphasized the importance of NATO demonstrating to the AU that it is a reliable partner.

Iraq

¶16. (C/NF) The SYG noted with regret the attempt on the life of the Polish Ambassador to Iraq, General Edward Pietrzyk.

Response to Terrorism

¶17. (C/NF) The SYG expressed condolences for recent attacks in Turkey and noted his October 1 public statement condemning the attack on a passenger bus in Eastern Turkey. Referring to the presentation by the Special Committee at last week's NAC of a paper on homegrown terrorism, he noted that a paper will be published next week by the TTIU on the significance of the Indian subcontinent to homegrown terrorism. Turkish PermRep Ildem thanked the SYG for his words regarding the recent acts of terrorism and told the NAC that Turkey believes the acts were perpetrated by the PKK, an accusation supported by the fact that either A4 or C4 explosives were used, which is common in PKK's attacks. Additionally, Ildem noted an agreement signed on September 28 between Turkey and Iraq to cooperate against terrorism, specifically the PKK and Al Qaida.

¶18. (C/NF) The SYG addressed a question posed last week by the Spanish PermRep regarding updating the 2005 NAC CT tasking to the NATO Office of Security, saying that the Office of Security will examine the update to the paper it prepared for the 2006 NATO Summit in Riga with the aim of preparing a new paper for the 2008 Bucharest Summit.

AOB

¶19. (C/NF) The SYG noted that the military advice on alternative ways to structure the NRF was under silence in the Military Committee until Wednesday at 17:00. If it passes silence, it would then go to the NAC, after which the SYG said he hoped work at SHAPE on the details of the proposed "graduated force" structure would happen quickly. He said he was concerned that the military advice alone would not be enough for Defense Ministers to have a substantive discussion at the October 24-25 informal defense ministerial in Noordwijk. The lack of detail could also negatively affect the November NRF Force Generation conference, since nations might be reluctant to contribute forces while it was still unclear the type of force to which they would be contributing.

NULAND